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LEGISLATION
ADVISORY BOARDS
Advisory boards are located in the field of administrative govern-
ment. This area of government is part of the executive branch. Good-
now has described it as "the activity of the government with the excep-
tion of the activity of both the legislature and the courts"; 1 or, as he has
expressed it in other terms, "administration is thus to be found in the
manifestations of the executive action." 2 Freund3 has said in discussing
administration that the American people are content to bestow admin-
istrative powers as a supplement to legislation which they are inclined
to pass as a cure for social and economic evils. It is this inclination as
well as the growth of a more complex civilization that has made the
field of administration so indispensable in the system of American gov-
ernment. Freund3 has further stated that there is no adequate tech-
nique of administrative procedure but nevertheless he expresses confi-
dence that such technique will be obtained in the future. Administration
functions through agencies composed of officers, boards, or commissions,
many of which have been established in the executive departments of
our federal and state governments. These administrative agencies are
the usual means of carrying out the activities of the executive branch.
The advisory board is such an agency, but it is distinguishable in that
its function is not to effectuate the "manifestations of the executive
action," but to advise, recommend, and investigate such activities re-
posed in an administrative agency. However not all so-called advisory
boards are limited to the above characteristics; some have been endowed
not only with the privilege of advising, recommending and investigat-
ing, but also with the power to enforce their decisions. For this reason,
advisory boards may be classified into two groups; the first,' those
which are coordinate in function and subordinate in power to the
1 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Government, p. x.
2 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Government, p. z.
' Freund, The Growth of American Administrative Law, p. 39.
4 Examples: Ohio Gen. Code 154-47; Ohio Gen. Code 71o-6 et seq.;
proposed Boyd Unemployment Insurance bill (Ohio); Ohio Gen. Code
154-39a; Ohio Gen. Code 154-45; Ohio Gen. Code 154-15. The last two
statutes differ from the others in that they neither provide for mandatory
boards nor for members to be appointed by the governor. Their membership
as well as their existence is dependent in the one case (Ohio Gen. Code 154-
45) upon the discretion of the Industrial Commission and in the other case
(Ohio Gen. Code 154-15), upon the discretion of the director of the respec-
tive administrative departments exercising the power granted under the section.
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ordinary administrative board, officer or commission; and the second,5
those which are super-imposed upon the ordinary administrative board,
officer, or commission.
To elaborate upon this distinction the boards in group one have
duties and privileges of recommending, defining, proposing, and advising
administrative agencies, but this is the extent of their function. They
must resort to a sanction by public opinion to enforce their decisions.
On the other hand, the second type of advisory board possesses not only
the characteristics of the former but it has power as well; what it
decrees, it can enforce. It is virtually independent of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches, and its discretion is apparently unlim-
ited if it functions within the boundaries established by the law of its
creation, within which it is checked only by the possibility of removal of
its members for malfeasance in office.
Statutes establishing advisory boards may be considered as being in
the field of special legislation. Although it is difficult to draw a line
between special as distinguished from general legislation, for the purposes
of definition, special legislation may be defined as legislation which limits
itself to a phase of law dissociated from every other, while general may
be defined as broad or comprehensive legislation applied to numerous
phases of a legal field. However, whether a given statute will be classi-
fied in either the general or special area is dependent upon the perspec-
tive of the person making the differentiation; for example, it may be
stated that statutes creating advisory boards are limited to the field of
administrative law, therefore they may be considered special in that, out
of all the branches of government, they are limited to the administrative
field alone. Furthermore, if a statute creates an advisory board as does
the Michigan statute,' which is to "exercise supervisory control over
the functions and activities of all administrative departments," the stat-
ute, from a perspective of the field of administration as a whole, is
general legislation; however, if a statute creates an advisory board lim-
ited to a specific phase of the administrative field as does Ohio Gen.
Code 71 o-6, which is limited to a specific field of banking, in accordance
with the above reasoning it is special legislation.
Legislation, categorically speaking, may be either regulatory or
declaratory. "Where legislation operates in purely conventional terms
(hours of labor, rates of interest) it is clearly regulative, where it
operates within the recognized categories of misconduct it is declara-
5 Examples: McKinney's consolidated laws of N. Y.; Title 4, Banking
Law, par. IO et seq.; Laws of Mich. (1929) Chap. I1, seC. 2oi et seq.;
Public Acts of Mich. (1919) No. z8z.
' Laws of Mich. (1929) Chap. Ix, Sec. 201 et seq.
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tory."'  Declaratory legislation pertains to subject matter which is
anti-social; whereas regulatory legislation concerns subject matter which
is not anti-social itself, but becomes anti-social when under certain cir-
cumstances being unregulated it assumes a nefarious aspect which results
in a menace to organized society. Or, otherwise stated, declaratory
legislation concerns offences mala in se and regulatory legislation con-
cerns offences mala prohibita. "An offence malum in se is properly
defined as one which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a
civilized community, whereas an act malum prohibitum is wrong only
because made so by the statute."' In accordance with these distinctions,
statutes creating advisory boards may be classified as regulatory. As an
example of such a statute, the Ohio banking act' establishing an advisory
board is typical. It regulates the business of banking which in itself is
not an evil but when, in a laissez faire economy, it adversely exploits
the interests of a great number of people dependent upon it, it becomes
obnoxious and a fit subject of regulative legislation.
Some regulatory statutes are self-executing and others are not. In
the New York banking statute"0 power is given the banking board "(5)
to limit and regulate withdrawals of deposits and shares from * * * "
This is clearly not self-executing, but if the legislature should frame a
statute declaring that all depositors who withdraw more than five hun-
dred dollars from the bank should be fined this would be self-executing;
for the moment the person breached the statute he would be ipso facto
guilty under it. The desired result would be obtained without the aid
of a board, officer, or commission to administer the statute. But under
the New York statute, above, the legislature has given to an administra-
tive agency a power to execute a statute which is not self-executing.
The board then becomes a regulatory body exercising power which has
been delegated to it by the legislature. This is an example of what is
called deferred control or in other words, postponed control to be
exercised by an administrative agency in the future.
Control may be deferred to a regulatory body in at least two ways;
the first is by advance determination, the second is by corrective inter-
vention. When the first method is employed the legislature establishes
certain standards by statute and delegates a duty to an officer or another
agency to see that those who are subject to the act conform to its stand-
ards. No statute creating an advisory board is of this type. When the
7 Freund, Legislative Regulation, p. 56.
8 State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 991;
ilo Am. St. Rep. 818 (905).
" Ohio Gen. Code 71o-6.
10 N. Y. Banking Laws, par. IOC.
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second method is used the legislature sets up broad standards and gives
to an administrative agency the power to determine in its discretion what
particular behavior shall be required of persons who come within the
scope of the standards. An illustration of this kind of deferred control
would be a statute establishing an administrative agency such as a super-
intendent of banks, purchasing agent or an unemployment council,
which, in its respective field, may demand that the person or persons
subject to its discretion conform with its interpretation of the intention
of the legislature or be subject to some disadvantage, penalty, or depriva-
tion of a benefit. Over these administrative bodies the governor or
legislature is the natural check and supervisory agency. Unlike these
usual administrative bodies, supra, the legislature has granted to advisory
boards powers of supervision and censure possessed by it or the governor.
These are powers which they had themselves exercised over the admin-
istrative agencies. Thus there comes into being an apparent deferred
control, reposing in an advisory board, which permits it to regulate or
otherwise control a deferred power reposing in an administrative board,
officer, or commission. Advisory boards, therefore, appear to be super-
structures, for at the base are found the persons subject to the legislation
and above these the ordinary administrative agencies and above these
the advisory boards, all of which are under the control of the legislature
or governor. However, at this point a line must be drawn between the
advisory boards classified in group one and group two, supra. Of these
the latter group (boards which have duties, privileges and powers) are
superstructures because they are the only boards which have the com-
plete control of the agencies beneath them. On the other hand, the
former boards in group one (boards with duties and privileges but no
powers) are not superstructures, but are-coordinate structures function-
ing on the same level as the administrative agencies in this so-called
hierarchy of administrative government.
A careful examination of the statutes which create the first type of
advisory boards reveals that these statutes do not strictly fall within the
scope of deferred control through corrective intervention. Here the
delegation of what appears to be deferred control is a delegation of
privilege only." The boards thus being recipients if no power cannot
make effective their decisions. It follows therefore that no control has
been deferred, for control is "to exercise restraining or directing influ-
ence over."' 2 This is illustrated by the proposed Boyd Unemployment
Insurance bill of Ohio. In this act the board or advisory council as it
" See Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L.J., p. 38 for a discussion
of powers and privileges.
12 Webster's dictionary.
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is called, has the privilege to "conduct research of its own, make public
reports, and recommend to the commission, to the governor, and to
the legislature needed changes from time to time." Similarly in the
Ohio banking act, supra, there is no provision made for the enforcement
of the performances of the board. To define its so-called "powers,"
words are used such as "to advise" and "recommend," "to propose,"
"to consider," and "to submit." Only in paragraphs 3 (4) and (5) of
Ohio Gen. Code 7 1 o-6a is there any semblance of power. By these
sections the board may define an emergency under 71o-86 and permit
the establishment of branch banks without compliance with 7 10-37-
A similar examination of the second group of statutes reveals that
they also do not fall within the classification of legislation by deferred
control through corrective intervention. For in them the legislature
has established broader standards than it usually does in the case of
deferred control by corrective intervention. It has enacted a broad
declaration of policy or has delegated to the boards certain powers
which in substance are declarations of policy. The boards have been per-
mitted to work out their own procedure and exercise their own discretion
as they see fit in achieving these ends. Quoting from the New York
banking act:14 For the purpose effectuating the policy declared in
ioa [* * * business of all corporations and persons subject to the
banking law shall be supervised and regulated * * * to insure the
safe and sound conduct of such business * * * to prevent hoarding of
money, to eliminate unsound and destructive competition * * * and
thus to maintain public confidence in such business and protect the public
interests and the interests of depositors, creditors, and stockholders] the
banking board shall have powers by a two-thirds vote of its members to
make and amend rules and regulations not inconsistent with law."
Continuing in the act we find "without limiting the foregoing power,
uses and regulations may be made for the following purposes * * *
(4) To prescribe from time to time (a) rates of interest, if any, which
may be paid on deposits with banks, trust companies, private bankers,
industrial bankers, and other corporations or agencies thereof subject
to the law." In this statement it appears that the legislature has com-
pletely delegated to the board its own power of establishing standards
of interest rates. This is a true delegation of control for when the board
acts, its act is mandatory; nor need it resort to sanction by public opinion
13 Ohio Gen. Code I54-39a establishing a building and loan advisory
board is almost identical to this statute creating the banking advisory board,
Ohio Gen. Code 7 1o-6, et sey1. with the exception of paragraphs (4) and (5)
of Ohio Gen. Code 71o-6a.
14 N. Y. Banking Laws, par. loc.
94 LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1936
for enforcement of its acts as would be the case if it were a recipient of
a mere privilege. It is even given power by a two-thirds vote to dismiss
from employment any disobedient director, trustee, or officer who is
subject to the act. The act provides that if he continues in such office
thereafter, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (This latter provision,
it may be noted, is self-executory). This type of statute creates a
deferred control which may be employed by a board practically inde-
pendent of restraint and supervision. In this respect it transcends cor-
rective intervention and is similar to another form of deferred control
described as regulation by organization. In this type the state, instead
of doing the regulating itself, establishes in the form of an organization
the necessary machinery of self governing. However, although this
statute may not coincide completely with what may be termed deferred
control by organization it approaches it, in that in a separate field such
as banking it regulates a complete unit without interference.
An examination of the composition of these boards discloses an
interesting application of the technique employed to select a personnel
best fitted for the tasks before it. Under the New York and Ohio
banking laws, supra, the members of the boards are chosen with the
greatest of care. Both of these acts require the respective boards to be
made up of members from definite banking groups. The New York
law goes so far as to require that the banks of these respective groups
nominate the members to the board by preferential ballot. The object
of this is to assure that a representative group of bankers as well as men
who are familiar with the banking business will regulate this branch of
administrative government. The advisory board for purchasing" is
made up of stewards from the various state institutions. Here again
the personnel is chosen with the purpose that members shall be fitted for
their tasks. In the proposed Boyd Unemployment Insurance bill in
Ohio the same thing is sought. Over and above the unemployment com-
mission is placed an advisory council. Members of it are chosen from
employers, employees, and other stated professional groups. In all these
statutes it is clear that the major purpose of the legislatures is to procure
a board fitted to understand the respective phase of administrative gov-
ernment in which it is associated.
In most cases the legislatures have not appropriated fixed salaries for
the members of advisory boards.'" Members' compensation is limited
to necessary expenses. For this reason it is supposed that persons who
seek to serve on the board will not be enticed by large salaries and that
"s Public Acts of Mich. (i9'9) No. z8z.
16 Ohio Gen. Code 71o-6; Public Acts of Mich. (i9x9) No. z8z; Mc-
Kinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Bk. 4, Banking Law, par. I0 et sey.
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appointment to membership will not be based on political patronage.
But on the other hand there may be those who are attracted by power
which may be wielded for their own selfish benefits. Expense accounts
may even be fabricated. To thwart this possibility it has been suggested
that acceptance by an appointee of a position on the board be made man-
datory. With this provision in addition to the provisions already included
in the statutes, the boards ought to be composed of a competent member-
ship. As an added check, the legislatures have also provided for suffi-
ciently long terms and appointments in rotation so that one political
administration can not during any one period exert too much influence
on the board.
A board to be truly advisory must in a great part be free from
restrictions and restraints. If one is controlled in the advice he gives it
is no longer his advice. Therefore an advisory board must function as
its own initiative dictates. For that reason it can not assure an effective
attainment of its objectives, because its success in a great part is depen-
dent on its personnel. The advisory board is no panacea of all admin-
istrative defects but is a valiant attempt to shear the administrative
department of its potential inherent deficiencies.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH
MORTGAGES
PAROLE RELEASE OF AN EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
On March I, x916, Mungeon Cooney delivered to the plaintiff,
Frederick Orth, a mortgage on certain real estate. Cooney died testate
in 1920, leaving all his property to his widow, and appointing her
executrix. In 1927 the widow died intestate leaving her son, Wayne
Cooney, her sole heir. Apparently the condition of defeasance within
the mortgage was broken by the failure to meet interest payments, al-
though such payments were made by Wayne Cooney up to March i,
1931. In 1934 Orth and Wayne Cooney made an oral agreement
whereby the mortgagee was to accept a release of the equity of redemp-
tion in return for the cancellation of the mortgage indebtedness. When
the deed was tendered, Orth refused to accept it and later filed an
application as creditor of Mungeon Cooney for letters of administration
de bonis non of the estate of Mungeon Cooney. This application was
denied in the Probate Court of Hardin County and allowed on error to
the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the Common Pleas Court and affirmed that of the Probate
Court. The Appellate Court held that an executory parol contract is
